

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RI

"PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE NAVAL SERVICES:
REENGINEERING THE COMMITMENT OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?"

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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
8 November 1996

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification This Page

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE NAVAL SERVICES: REENGINEERING THE COMMITMENT OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? (u)			
9. Personal Authors: WILLIAM FLEMMING BARNES, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NAVY			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 16 MAY 96	
12. Page Count: 30			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: PEACE OPERATIONS, PEACEKEEPING, NAVAL FORCES, MARITIME OPERATIONS, MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATIONS, MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.			
15. Abstract: Interest in peace operations has increased dramatically, but has also raised speculation and suspicion within Congress and DOD. This paper examines the operational effects of distinguishing peace operations and MOOTW from a naval perspective. An aspect of maintaining forward presence, MOOTW are missions in which sailors and marines have typically excelled. For the Naval Component Commander, the operational concerns attendant to this distinction include: is an explicit doctrine required; are experienced participants necessary; is there a need for specialized training and preparation; is adequate staffing available; and is specialized state-of-the-art, pre-staged equipment in place. How can a CINC expand the naval capability to conduct peace operations without sacrificing war fighting expertise? There are options for an operational commander to prepare the naval component and the joint force.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841- 6461 6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

Security Classification of This Page Unclassified

ABSTRACT

Recent interest in peace operations has increased throughout the administration and the diplomatic community while raising speculation as well as suspicion within the Congress and the Department of Defense. Once the exclusive domain of United Nations forces, these missions were rarely undertaken outside this context. As true with many other departures from convention in the post-Cold War years, preparations for and conduct of peace operations have evolved. In the September 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), peace operations were identified as one of four emerging missions that compelled immediate attention.

This paper examines the operational effects of distinguishing peace operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) from a naval perspective. As one aspect of maintaining a credible forward presence, MOOTW are missions in which sailors and marines have typically excelled. Whether conducting Maritime Interception Operations or providing humanitarian relief, the record of achievement is impressive. Distinguishing peace operations as a separate category from MOOTW could have an operational effect. For the Naval Component Commander, the operational concerns attendant to this distinction include: is an explicit doctrine required; are experienced participants necessary; is there a need for specialized training and preparation; is adequate staffing available; and is specialized state-of-the-art, pre-staged equipment in place. Whether these questions can be answered adequately to meet the growing demand for peace operations using the present force composition and operational tempos is not easily determined.

How can a CINC expand the naval capability to conduct peace operations without sacrificing war fighting expertise? Readiness for this contingency must begin long before forces are allocated, yet not at the expense of combat efficiency. There are options available to an operational commander to adequately prepare the naval component with subsequent benefit to the entire joint force.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers,
but only a soldier can do it."
-- Dag Hammarskjold

The former UN Secretary-General's words appear to ring truer now than when he first uttered them. Peacekeeping has evolved into a nearly full-time job that not only challenges soldiers, but also sailors, marines, and airmen along with a host of government agencies, non-government and private volunteer organizations (NGOs, PVOs). Humanitarian crises have commanded attention by the administration and the diplomatic community and US responses to them have raised speculation as well as suspicion within the Congress and the Department of Defense. Once the exclusive domain of United Nations forces, these missions were rarely undertaken outside this context. As true with many other departures from convention in the post-Cold War years, preparations for and conduct of peace operations have evolved.

In the September 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), peace operations were identified as one of four emerging missions that compelled immediate attention. "These mission areas provide significant security challenges and opportunities in the years ahead: *Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Information Warfare, Peace Operations and Operations Other Than War*. We recommend differentiating peace operations to give them greater prominence in contingency planning."¹ As the CORM appropriately concluded, any attempt to improve readiness to face these challenges requires Federal Government applications and commitment. These operations are crucial to deterring and preventing conflict and represent a core competency of each military service. Accordingly, the Department of the Navy can bring substantial talent to bear in reaching solutions: there are options available to an operational commander to adequately prepare the naval component which will also benefit the entire joint force.

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How Subtle a Distinction?

When viewed as one aspect of maintaining a credible forward presence, MOOTW missions are an area in which sailors and marines have typically excelled. Whether conducting Maritime Intercept Operations or providing humanitarian relief, their record of achievement is impressive. Operations such as EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, SHARP GUARD, FIREY VIGIL and SEA ANGEL are celebrated examples of a swift response by forward-deployed naval forces to natural and manmade crises. But since peace operations have primarily been the bailiwick of ground forces, extracting available information on naval forces in direct support of peace operations, results in lean data. The experiences center principally around traditional peacekeeping conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.²

Distinguishing peace operations as a separate category from MOOTW (as the CORM recommends), may have unexpected operational effects. Competition for resources and inclusion of units well trained and prepared for such missions must be resolved. For a combatant CINC's Naval Component Commander, there are numerous considerations that weigh in the decision to commit forces to either mission area. Trained principally to fight and win the nation's wars, forces reporting for duty in a peace operation have several concerns: is explicit doctrine required; are experienced participants necessary; is there a need for specialized training and preparation; is adequate staffing available; and is specialized state-of-the-art pre-staged equipment in place.

II. A FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED AND TERMS DEFINED

"Normally, a few definitions would be in order,
but I fear that this is an area notoriously difficult to define."
-- Richard M. Connaughton³

Within the context of this analysis, it will be helpful to review briefly the definition of certain terms as these are central to our understanding. Thankfully, a complete glossary of related

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terms appears in Joint Pub 3-07. The bedrock of US military doctrine, these essential definitions are subtly different than those offered in Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* and stress the military dimension.

Definitions

military operations other than war. Encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war. Also called MOOTW.

peace operations. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

peace building. Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.⁴

The recent political, economic and social landscape, along with the familiar, traditional security arrangements, have been significantly altered -- and will continue to shift for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, change has not been for the better but has been defined by violence and suffering. Thus, the prospects are good for expanded growth in both frequency and complexity of peace operations, requiring forces which have an enhanced capacity for the participants' self-defense and protection. With the exception of Desert Storm, these operations have resulted in the greatest losses of American lives since the Vietnam War.⁵ Additionally, the very nature of peace operations has changed. Myriad demands and requirements have been placed on troop-contributing nations. Missions are now more costly, "more muscular," and must be able to respond swiftly -- perhaps even before an instrument of peace is signed. Some would

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ask, "Should the US military be engaged in peace operations at all?" The answer is a resounding, yet qualified, "yes."

The US is faced with a dilemma when attempting to decouple peace operations from MOOTW without sacrificing readiness. The National Security Strategy identifies the determinants for labeling a scenario as being "in the US national interest." Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 further qualifies US involvement and makes a distinction between those instances in which the US will become involved, and those it will merely support. "It is not US policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or US involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy . . . aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of US policy on peacekeeping."⁶

This extract from PDD 25 articulates the crux of the problem accompanying future US involvement. While the Clinton administration has attempted to establish a framework for decision-making by applying preconditions and "permissives" for involvement, this approach often runs counter to UN goals. While Congress is trying to limit US involvement in making, keeping, or enforcing peace, the UN still has peace operations fixed prominently on its agenda. Despite a 1995 high of nearly 70,000 UN peacekeepers in the field, man's inhumanity to man was not noticeably curbed; but it might have been even nastier had the UN not been there, doing its bit.⁷ This "bit" has come under tremendous scrutiny of late, particularly in the wake of the organization's performance in Somalia. Reactions have run the gamut from calls for a complete and radical overhaul of the UN to more benign calls for more equitable assessments among its 185 member nations.

Numerous international situations will exist that do not meet the administration's strict criteria of involvement and to which the international community will nevertheless choose to respond. As a superpower, the US will thus be faced with a conundrum. PDD 25 or follow-on legislation does not absolve policymakers from taking responsibility for conflict resolution.

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Neither does strict adherence to this or any other formula abdicate our humanitarian and democratic obligations as the remaining superpower. Whether by direct involvement and judicious commitment of military forces or through leadership in the Security Council, it is unquestionable that the US will continue to help shape international policies and military operations.

An Uncommon Approach

The central purpose of peace operations -- to prevent, halt or contain conflict -- requires combat-ready military forces sufficient to accomplish the mission.⁸ MOOTW, on the other hand, that broad grouping into which peace operations and other non-combat functions are presently arranged, may be characterized by expedience. Restoration and maintenance of law and order, humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief are typical functions. The limited use of DOD forces for these operations will continue to be appropriate where speed is essential or other capabilities are not available.⁹ These missions are more benign, than those which require placement of combat troops into a situation where they are expected to build, enforce, keep or make peace. In general terms, political support can be obtained for disaster relief, as there is both willingness and enthusiasm to devote military assets to relieve overwhelming suffering until appropriate help from other agencies assisted by NGOs or PVOs can be arranged. Conversely, little support can be mustered when there is an increased risk to participants and possible transition to combat. The end state is clearly different and perhaps not as readily achievable, but every bit as important as in MOOTW.

Against this backdrop it would appear that there is no need to redefine naval priorities; that is, these are merely "soldier's duties" and whether categorized as an emerging mission, or not is immaterial to the Navy. Upon closer review, it is apparent that naval forces provide sizable contributions to these efforts and can enhance readiness for potential tasking. With an inherent ability to operate globally or concentrate regionally, naval forces are uniquely qualified for peace operations. They arrive in theater with distinct advantages resident onboard and have a virtually

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unlimited capacity to sustain operations. Being highly adaptable, ships, aircraft squadrons and a host of specialized units have distinguished themselves in past, recent and present missions.

"Naval forces have a role to play in disputes which are centered ashore. Since the end of the Cold War, maritime patrols and interception forces have been placed around Iraq, Haiti, in the Adriatic and on the Danube; naval forces in the river deltas of Cambodia have conducted nation-building tasks; forward staging bases were established off the coast of Somalia; and peace meetings have been conducted at sea off the coast of Bosnia."¹⁰

As a matter of policy, the commitment is clearly articulated: The Navy position on peace operations is that these missions are "a set of distinct points which fall along the wide continuum of naval forward presence missions. The same skills which enable the Navy to succeed in combat provide for competence in the performance of peacekeeping operations."¹¹ Unlike other services requiring specialized training to perform this mission (and with a corresponding trade-off in readiness for combat as a result of increased emphasis on "constabulary" skills), projecting power over the beach, securing the sea lines of communication and adjacent airways, offering command and control, and providing sea and airlift logistics support to operations are all traditional duties conducted by deployed ships and squadrons. "The Navy does not generally designate specific skills or units to MOOTW. . . Navy Construction Battalions build and defend whether they are in Somalia, Haiti or Iraq; Navy doctors, nurses, and corpsmen perform trauma care regardless of where the injuries were received."¹²

While not every conflict presents a potential naval or maritime resolution, there are instances that are ideally suited to this sort of response; similarly, there are specific missions that only naval forces can accomplish. The selection of a naval presence may be a valid alternative when political leadership is determined to "do something," but the option to commit troops to a scenario may result in an over-extension, may be unpopular (or politically untenable), is too risky, or is simply not feasible due to logistics limitations or functions of force structure.

It may not be possible to predict the precise level of future US involvement and

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commitment, but it is reasonable to assert that participation is definitely in keeping with both the National Security Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" and the Navy's vision of "Forward . . . From the Sea." The conceptual documents 2020 Vision and the Navy Operational Concept, list sea control as a fundamental mission. Centered around this understanding these views of future force employment are intended to bridge strategy and operational-tactical requirements emphasizing Naval Expeditionary Task Force operations. Placed in the littoral and capable of power projection ashore, naval efforts are best poised in this position to have their influence recognized. Just as power projection across the beach in combat is enabled by naval forces, so are there several advantages stemming from an afloat-centered command element in a peace operation.

First, sea basing provides mobile, sovereign platforms; sustainable logistics support, and secure, unobtrusive bases from which to conduct peace operations; they do not exacerbate cultural tensions that arise when well fed and equipped forces are introduced into the middle of a strife torn and destitute people.

Second, they insulate the "soft," vulnerable, high value logistics infrastructure from looting and riot, and avoid the development of a large headquarters (or) logistics base that is vulnerable to indirect weapons, requires security, and is difficult to extract upon mission completion. Sea basing enables the ground components of the peace operation to maintain an expeditionary posture . . . This leaves visible and influential those NGOs or local authorities that are expected to assume responsibility when military forces are withdrawn.¹³

The size of the footprint left ashore can have a critical impact on an operation's success (particularly when two or more separate cultures clash). That aspect is both minimized and contributes to requisite impartiality when based afloat. Additionally, navies, operating in an international environment but still close to the area in question, allow governments to keep options open in a confusing and uncertain situation.¹⁴

A Multilateral Dimension

It is obvious that the UN cannot reliably fulfill each possible mission facing a geographic CINC. For example, "peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mix poorly. The UN found itself

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doing both badly."¹⁵ Using history as a gauge once more, "many future military operations will be conducted with coalition partners. The CINCs need to expand their planning and preparation for such operations."¹⁶ While it is conceivable that MOOTW missions may be performed unilaterally, it is unlikely that the US would enter a peace operation without the increased unity of effort, legitimacy and consensus that gird a combined effort. These attributes can be effectively cultivated through increased engagement and can be further developed by increasing expertise through bilateral and multilateral operations and exercises. The by-product then is a means to successfully prepare for conducting peace operations together. Naval forces are of particular value with other militaries because they can exercise not only with navies, but also with land and air forces, as they do frequently in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, all without intruding onto others' territory.¹⁷ Our ability to enlist allies in pursuit of our goals testifies to our strength and lightens our burden; international cooperation in achieving peace and democracy is vital to the success of US foreign policy during this historic transition in world affairs and a necessary complement to skillful bilateral diplomacy.¹⁸ Prepared naval forces, strengthened by determined coalition partners, produce a synergistic effect that can figure decisively in a confrontation.

The basis for successful international coalition membership among naval personnel is the growing expertise founded in numerous bilateral and multilateral operations and exercises. "The US Navy conducts an extensive program of some 200 bilateral and multinational exercises each year across all maritime regions. Practicing with local partners in coastal waters offers the USN opportunities to improve its littoral warfare skills benefiting from the geographic challenges and the simulated threat capabilities small navies could provide."¹⁹ These range in degree of difficulty from simple to intricate: basic single-ship "passing exercise" opportunities present one aspect, while elaborate joint and combined undertakings represent an enhanced capability. Often exercises include valued port visits to conduct pre-sail and post-exercise discussions. These visits personalize the operation with the attendant benefit for participants being the familiarity gained with one another's capabilities while promoting cultural exchange. On a small scale, bonds of

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camaraderie and friendship are forged which enhance the exercise schedule of events, foster tactical development and encourage cooperation. However, from broader, and more importantly, strategic and operational perspectives, the resulting success adeptly demonstrated at sea by exercise participants has the very real potential to frame the structure of international naval cooperation for crisis response and contingency tasking. Continued association and development will perfect this competence; and can be reinforced in ways far different than combined maneuvers on land. Furthermore, these associations can produce tangible dividends such as the "groundbreaking commitment by Japan to supply US forces with ammunition and other material in peacetime and for UN peacekeeping purposes."²⁰

"In multinational operations the goal is to ensure compatibility between coalition partners."²¹ Lieutenant General A.C. Zinni's words are mirrored in the fundamental objectives for naval exercises involving two (or more) countries: furthering mutual understanding and promoting interoperability (the explicit language of exercise letters of intention, planning and operational message traffic). There is abundant precedent on which to make the claim that navies can and in fact do contribute to forming successful coalitions; two specific examples include: countermine and mine clearance operations in the Gulf War were initially performed by ships of the US Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Saudi Naval Force and the WEU; additionally, in DESERT STORM/OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH, UN sanctions against Iraq through Maritime Interception Operations and enforcement of the no-fly zone have been effectively maintained by ships and aircraft from a variety of contributing nations.²² A multinational effort, NATO TF 440, in the Adriatic represents a three-carrier commitment to peacekeeping.²³ The other end of the spectrum is represented by the 1992 Argentine experience operating fast patrol boats under the United Nations flag during peace operations support in the Gulf of Fonseca.²⁴

In the Western Pacific, the US Navy is engaged in a vigorous exercise program with allied navies. Maintaining this program has long been a prominent CINCPAC objective and, as conducted by the Commander, Seventh Fleet, this program is both sophisticated in its tactical

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complexity and operational goals.²⁵ Additional distinguishing features of the program are enhancing the real-time security commitments to Pacific Rim allies it represents and the balance it provides to off-set operations by the People's Republic of China and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Additionally, in the CINCCENT area of responsibility (AOR), a destroyer squadron was recently commissioned to provide a forward deployed naval component and a vital FIFTH FLEET liaison with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) navies. As part of a much larger and more complex exercise program, Destroyer Squadron 50 (DESRON 50) conducts a vast series of exercises with USN Arabian Gulf deploying ships and GCC countries yearly; the derived expertise from this presence and stability in command relationships cannot be overstated (especially considering that this duty previously fell to deployed DESRON commanders). International naval exercises are also prevalent in other AORs (e.g., *UNITAS*) and share the same goals.

From an operational perspective, two things are clear to strategic and operational planners concerning what future role naval forces will assume in support of peace operations: their inherent advantages place them in demand and their demonstrated capacity identifies them as the initial force of choice. *An outgrowth of thriving experience in both operational and exercise scenarios is the likelihood of additional peace operations for naval forces.*

III. SURVEYING DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

"This manual supports soldiers and leaders who execute peace operations. . . "
-- FM 100-23

These words of the US Army's Field Manual *Peace Operations* preface the service doctrine. Derived from numerous lessons learned and drawing on the credibility of rich experience in actual conduct of a full array of peace operations, this manual enunciates the practical requirements necessary for success. A planning and execution companion to Joint Pub

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3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, together these two volumes put forth the overarching principles that govern US military participation. Naval Doctrine Pub 1 *Naval Warfare* (and Pub 3, *Naval Operations*, when issued) will similarly provide doctrinal direction specifically geared to inclusion of naval forces in operations of this nature. Despite the comprehensiveness, no doctrine can be so all-inclusive as to adequately cover every contingency. The unique characteristics of each experience defy commonality, but have produced a sizable data base essential to planning and preparation for future undertakings.²⁶

Peace operations are inherently joint and each service retains core competencies that represent valuable contributions to success. Whether a naval officer is in command or providing support, ample guidance for planning and employment are available. While not joint doctrine *per se*, the *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* is an essential catalog that considers all aspects of joint and multinational operations based on recent experiences. Three pillars of support which the Joint Task Force Commander must ensure remain strong are military-security, humanitarian-economic and political-diplomatic activities; any imbalance can place mission accomplishment in certain jeopardy.²⁷ The *Peacekeepers Handbook* offers a pragmatic, balanced civil-military approach to the subject; absent is any reference to maritime issues. Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, contains a segment on Maritime Operations that articulates possible roles and missions in support of peacekeeping. It recognizes the probable limitations and scope of involvement (as compared to ground forces), and speaks to a finite list of contributions.²⁸ The companion piece is a draft Naval Doctrine Command Publication, *Multinational Maritime Operations*. Although not specifically targeted to peace operations, this document echoes the principle of unity of effort and stresses the cardinal mechanics of cooperation and interoperability. "Nations can prepare for these operations through political interaction, exercises and war games, personnel exchanges, port visits, cultural, legal and language training and equipment standardization programs with potential partners."²⁹

From this review it is apparent that *existing (or soon to be released) doctrine is*

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sufficiently thorough both to formulate effective training and conduct operations.

IV. TACTICAL MEANS TO OPERATIONAL ENDS

"To accomplish your mission, you will have to refocus your thinking from warfighting to peace operations, particularly for peacekeeping. This should not be interpreted as de-emphasizing warfighting. It simply means that peace operations have uncertainties that require a different view."

-- JTF Commander's Handbook

In keeping with the CORM's recommendations for DOD to improve coalition operations and elevate the priority to support peace operations, expanding maritime training opportunities would readily accomplish both of these goals. This is not, however, easily achieved in view of the present force structure. Carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups routinely deploy with fewer escorts than they once did and their presence is meticulously "tethered and gapped" during change of operational commanders to accommodate competing strategic requirements. Particular care must also be taken when dismantling groups that have trained and prepared to fight together in order to support separate operations. A balance can be achieved by precise selection of participating ships, matching relative combat power with actual command and control capability. Often it is not necessary to dedicate a TICONDEROGA-class Aegis cruiser to an exercise when an OLIVER HAZARD PERRY-class frigate will suffice. There are many additional tactical advantages opting for a "low-end" mix of ships as the situation dictates (e.g., shallow draft, helicopter facility, no theater-strike mission requirements, less-sophisticated combat systems, etc.).

Innovations

There are abundant possibilities for improving interoperability as a means of readying naval forces for peace operations without compromising warfighting proficiency. History and doctrine have approached the problem from different avenues that have proven successful. Three additional innovations are introduced here:

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1. *Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) are perhaps the most readily identifiable maritime support to peace operations.* Several nations now possess accomplished Visit Boarding Search and Seizure teams replete with invaluable experience derived from UN Security Council sanctions enforcement duty in both the Arabian Gulf and the Adriatic. The need to perfect this skill further is all but certain considering MIOs efficiency, effectiveness and attractiveness as a strategic option. Coalition building can be enhanced by exporting the techniques using MIO team exchanges in order to increase familiarity with procedures, promote standardization of equipment, and refine tactics. USCG Law Enforcement Detachments numbers are finite. A protracted commitment, or introduction of another (simultaneous) requirement could rapidly diminish their effectiveness and sustainability. Wider engagement by coalition partners would alleviate this problem. Another option is to move the operation ashore, as is now the case for Red Sea traffic en route the Arabian Gulf. The underway commitment was eliminated and sanctions compliance is now verified in the port of Aqaba, releasing significant surface ship assets for other tasking.

2. *Naval exercises and operations are being conducted more extensively in the littoral.* With minimal disruption to exercise schedules of events (many recognized as already ambitious), planners could include a "Post-Hostilities, War Termination Phase" that provides at least some on-station time for support to peace operations. Transition from combat (exercise) to peacekeeping and enforcement could dovetail with exercise objectives, while re-evaluating previous lessons learned. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO and other similar concerns would realistically have an impact on ships' and squadrons' availability and the proposed remedy is to start or conclude with a command post exercise. Participants could complete this phase en route homeport or follow-on tasking. A cogent, long-range, "building block" approach (i.e. capitalizing on previous events, beginning with a unilateral CJTF, then expanding to a multinational force) with tiered complexity and depth would be challenging and increase the breadth of

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with tiered complexity and depth would be challenging and increase the breadth of understanding.³⁰ Command and control issues at a minimum could be identified (perhaps a suitable trial for the rapidly deployable UN headquarters C2 team). Here US Navy personnel can make significant contributions. Identifying those "subject matter experts" who have had considerable experience with recent peace operations can increase the general level of knowledge for the operating forces (advisor groups for instance) and throughout the formal education and training establishment (tactical through operational as well as national-strategic levels), providing a quantum readiness improvement.³¹

3. *There is an indisputable need for patrol craft in maritime peace operations.* Their speed, abundance and versatility characterize their fitness for accomplishment of any number of doctrinal missions. Appendix A contains a current worldwide survey of significant patrol boats by country. Nations that have now or previously participated in UN peacekeeping operations are also indicated. "Even where coalition partners are small, reluctant, or of limited military value, their presence adds value by increasing the legitimacy and credibility of the operation."³² As a means of expanded engagement and development of a much needed skill, US commitment of a surface combatant -- the precise ship type is unimportant -- to fulfill the role as "mother ship" by providing basic support, primarily command and control structure, initially as part of a CINC's exercise to include an element of peace operations would pay tremendous practical and operational dividends. Such benefits include increased multinational interoperability, demonstrated resolve and execution of a very real and pragmatic contingency to name a few. The sailors who are involved would receive an expanded and valuable skill set, honed at sea with future coalition partners. The numerous preconditions, qualifications and legal limitations (even constitutional restrictions for some states) are recognized and could be resolved at some point. The subsidiary benefits are similarly important: an exercise of this nature would appropriately demonstrate the value of practically managing readiness for peace operations throughout DOD; it would

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accomplish two CORM recommendations; and it would comply with both the spirit and letter of PDD 25.

V. CONCLUSION

"US military participation in peace operations may involve peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, or other military operations in support of diplomatic actions to establish and maintain peace."

-- JTF Commander's Handbook

Reflecting on his experience during the withdrawal of the the UN peacekeeping force from Somalia, LTGEN Anthony Zinni, the JTF Commander remarked, "These kinds of operations are consuming our armed forces right now. Whether we should or shouldn't, I'll tell you this -- *we are*."³² Peace operations are a valuable means of promoting stability and maintaining order. If carefully managed and with deference to the voluminous lessons learned from experiences such as Somalia and Haiti, they can restore order, particularly in a failed state scenario. "Peace operations have the potential to deal with precursor instabilities and, thus, to prevent conflicts from reaching a stage where US forces could be thrust into an active combatant role at considerably more expense and greater risk."³³

Naval forces can appropriately prepare for this new mission; whether it is included in MOOTW or treated as separate and distinct. Its value must be inculcated throughout the services in order to execute future tasking. Doing so is essential now, *before being committed* to the next operation. It is apparent from this review that existing doctrine is adequate, but continued innovation in its application is required. To achieve the proper balance without sacrificing fundamental warfighting capability and expand engagement with future coalition partners -- those organized under UN auspices as well as ad hoc -- requires the Naval services to continually refine command and control arrangements.

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NOTES

- ¹ Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), ES-4, September 1995.
- ² Jeffrey I. Sands' Center For Naval Analyses study (CRM 93-40), *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperations and the United Nations*, provides a definitive, historical account on the subject and offers US policy options. CDR D.L.W. Sim, RN, in his Naval War College Strategic Research Department Report 8-94, *Men of War for Misions of Peace: Naval Forces in Support of United Nations Resolutions*, likewise includes an appendix on historical operations geared for the non-naval reader.
- ³ Lewis, William H. (ed.), *Military Implications of UN Peacekeeping*, (Washington: National Defense University Press; McNair Paper 17), pg. 11. Richard M. Connaughton quoted as a panelist at NDU June 1993.
- ⁴ Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington DC: JCS, 1995), pp. GL 4-5. The Department of Defense added to this confusing lexicon of terms by insisting that the operation in Bosnia was "peace implementation." Thus, participants were organized as the Implementation Force (IFOR).
- ⁵ Clarke, Lt. Col, J.L., USA, "Which Forces for What Peace Ops?" *Proceedings*, February 1995, pg. 46. This article makes a case for Peace Enforcement in keeping with US participants' talents.
- ⁶ *THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS*, May 1994, pg. 3.
- ⁷ "Can It Keep the Peace?" *The Economist*, October 21, 1995, p. 18.
- ⁸ CORM, pg. 2-16
- ⁹ *Ibid*, 2-18.
- ¹⁰ Sim, pp. 12-13.
- ¹¹ N513, *MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, CORM WORKING GROUP ON PEACE OPERATIONS*, 5000 Ser N513/SU608209 dtd 20 JAN 95 ed., "NAVY POSITION ON PEACE OPERATIONS," encl. (1).
- ¹² *Ibid*.
- ¹³ N513 Memo.
- ¹⁴ Gove, Eric, "Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement: The British Experience in the Adriatic Sea," *International Peacekeeping*, Winter 1994, pg. 470.
- ¹⁵ "The United Nations: To Bury or to Praise?" *The Economist*, October 21, 1995, p. 27. Making a case for serious fighting is better left to "multi-national forces," this editorial cites Haiti as a model of the UN authorizing an action conducted by an ad-hoc coalition.
- ¹⁶ CORM, pg. 2-7.
- ¹⁷ USN, CNO Strategic Studies Group XIII, *Crisis Response And Influence*, pg. 7.
- ¹⁸ *Congressional Presentation for Promoting Peace: FY 1995*, pg. 5.
- ¹⁹ Hirschfeld, Thomas J., *Multinational Naval Cooperation Options*, Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 93-44.50/ December 1993, CNA Alexandria: 1993.
- ²⁰ "Accord Broadens Role for Japanese Forces," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 1 May 1996, 13.
- ²¹ *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Joint Warfighting Center, Ft. Monroe,

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VA, FEB 95), p. 40.

²² I commanded USS EXPLOIT (MSO 440) and USS ADROIT (MSO 509) from March 1989 until April 1991 during DESERT STORM and was privileged to participate in the multi-national force mine countermeasures and mine clearance campaigns; I commanded USS THACH (FFG 43) from November 1993 until September 1995. I also served as the Executive Officer in USS ROBERT G. BRADLEY (FFG 49) deploying to the Arabian Gulf during OPERATION EARNEST WILL (1988). The operating tempo in THACH especially was brisk and provided both the crew and me with significant first-hand experience in combined operations and numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises with Western Pacific allied navies. While many of these focused on Anti-Submarine Warfare tactics, the essential aspects of command and control which underpin interoperability and are absolutely central to peace operations were stressed and perfected. My most recent experience was particularly relevant: in one USN-Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) exercise (ASWEX 95-2JA/MATSU 95) THACH's Visit Boarding Search and Seizure team assisted a JMSDF team in a boarding of a simulated merchant ship; in the other, the USN-Royal Australian Navy southern hemisphere littoral warfare scenario included defense of an amphibious task force transiting the Great Barrier Reef and operations in the Gulf of Carpentaria. Additionally, during a 1994 COMUSNAVCENT deployment, THACH's VBSS team conducted over 400 queries and 7 boardings of northern Arabian Gulf merchant shipping.

²³ Eric Gove's article, "Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement: The British Experience in the Adriatic Sea," (*International Peacekeeping*, Winter 1994) is a first-hand chronicle of the 1993-4 Adriatic deployment and makes a convincing argument for multinational cooperation with modern surface combatants.

²⁴ Neves, CDR J. C., AN, *UN Peace-Keeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by Argentine Navy Units*, NWC Research Report 1-93 provides a detailed description of this operation with special cautions and pre-cautions for future consideration.

²⁵ The bi/multilateral exercise program for the USN is quantifiable, but specific details of numbers, participants and accomplishments exceeds the scope and level of classification of this research.

²⁶ Defense Technical Information Center IDA Document D-1755, *Alternative Multinational Force Capabilities for Operations Other Than War*, Appendix G (Vol. III) for instance, contains over 1100 lessons learned divided into 19 functional areas. The Navy Lessons Learned Data Base includes similar information, largely at the tactical level.

²⁷ *JTF Commander's Handbook*, pp. EX-5 and 35-44.

²⁸ *JOINT PUB 3-07.3*, "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations," I-7 thru 9: "Maritime involvement in PKO may involve supporting sealift, surface forces, submarine forces, amphibious forces or provision of individual observers. Naval forces may further contribute. . . a staging platform (particularly significant in the early stage); accompanying neutral shipping; providing neutral territory aboard; MIO; observation of an irregular coastline; coastal control; protection of offshore assets; harbor defense; mine countermeasures; search and rescue." Additionally, US Coast Guard capabilities, generally a constabulary function, are included as well.

²⁹ *Multinational Maritime Operations*, Naval Doctrine Command Draft 4, pg. ES-1/4. Chapter 4 of this publication is a primer on interoperability, complete with the latest status of EXTACs. It will contribute to doctrine what such combined-use publications as COMDESRON FIFTEEN & CINCSDFLT USN-JMSDF Standard Operating Procedures and others have successfully

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bestowed upon tactics.

³⁰ "There is a penalty to be paid for assigning units to PKOs. While one unit performs the mission, a second unit trains for the mission and a third unit retrain for its normal duties after redeployment." DTIC Study pg. S-10. From a naval perspective, actually exercising for a peace operation in concert with future ad hoc coalition members as part of a standard training regimen would at least partially mitigate this concern. Exercise Emerald Express included peace operations and non-combat evacuations: "all these sorts of things that my Marine expeditionary units live with, day in and day out." Zinni, *Proceedings*, pg. 29.

³¹ N3/5 Memo.

³² Hirschfeld, *Ibid*.

³³ Zinni, *Proceedings*, pg. 29.

³⁴ CORM, pg. 2-16.

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APPENDIX

A SURVEY OF PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

Source: *The Military Balance 1994-5*, Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies: London 1994. Numbers approximate only; highlighting major classes of ships, patrol, and riverine craft.

Contributors to UN and Peacekeeping Operations indicated by *

UNITED STATES*

6 6 *Cyclone* PCC

NATO

BELGIUM* (OPCON to be combined with Netherlands except for submarines)

7 MCMV No patrol craft

2 Frigates

CANADA* 6 6 *Fundy* (ex-MSC) PCC (trng.); 5 *Port St. Jean* PCC, 1 PCI (trng)

DENMARK* 35 10 Msl. *Willemoes* PFM; 27Ptl.
5 Offshore (1 *Beskytteren*, 4 *Thetis*) PCO
13 Coastal (10 *Flyvefisken*, 3 *Agdlek*) PCC
Inshore 9 *Barso*.

FRANCE* 23 1 *Albatross* PCO (Public Svc. Force)
20 Coastal; 10 *L'Audacieuse*, 8 *L'Eopard*; 1 *Sterne*, 1 *Grebe* PCC
Inshore 2 *Athos* PCI; 4 *Patra* PCI; *La Combattante* (LCBT) PCI
5 PCI (*Gendarmerie Maritime*).

GERMANY* 38 38 Msl. 10 *Albatros* (Type-143) PFM, 10 *Gepard* (T-143A)
18 *Tiger* (T-148) PFM, (plus 11 LCU/M).

GREECE* 42 5 Corvettes: 5 *Niki*
18 Msl Craft: 14 *La Skos* (Fr LCBT II/III) PFM, 2 I. *Votis* (Fr.
LCBT), 2 *Stamou*.
10 Torpedo: 6 *Hesperos* (Germ. *Jaguar* (Ge. *Jag.*)) PFT
4 *Nasty* PFT
9 Patrol 4 Coastal: 2 *Armatolos* (Dk. *Osprey*) PCC
2 *Pirpolitis* PCC; 5 Inshore: 2 *Tolmi*, 3 PCI.

ITALY* 16 6 Msl. *Sparviero* PHM
6 Offshore: 4 *Cassiopea*, 2 *Storione* (US *Aggressive* ex-MSO)
4 Coastal: 4 *Bambu* (ex-MSC) PCC Assigned to MFO.

NETHERLANDS* 12 MCM & 12 LCA Amphib. craft; 0 PCC.

NORWAY* 30 30 Msl Craft: 14 *Hauk*, 10 *Storm*, 6 *Snogg* PFM
Naval Home Guard: 13 Patrol Offshore: 3 *Nordkapp*, 1 *Nornen*,
2 *Farm*, 7 Chartered.

PORTUGAL* 30 6 Offshore: 6 *Joao* PCO; 10 *Cacine* PC
13 Inshore: 5 *Argos*; 8 Riverine.

SPAIN* 31 5 Offshore: 4 *Serviola*, 1 *Ch. Hreu*
10 Coastal: 10 *Anaga* PCC
16 Inshore: 6 *Baroleo* PFI; 10 PCI.

TURKEY* 45 16 Msl.: 8 *Dogan* (Ge. *Lurssen* (Ge. *Lur.*) - 57m) PFM;
8 *Kartal* (Ge. *Jaguar* (Ge. *Jag.*)) PHM
27 Patrol: 10 Coastal: 1 *Girne* PCC; 6 *Sultan Hisar* PCC; 3 *Trabzon* PCC
Inshore: 17: 1 *Bora* (US *Asheville*) PFI; 12 AB-25 PCI; 4 AB-21.
UK* 33 17 Offshore: 17 PCO: 1 *Endurance*, 2 *Castle*, 6 *Jersey*, 3 *Peacock*, 5 *River*
16 Inshore: 16 PCI: 2 *Kingfisher*, 12 *Archer* (4 trng.), 2 *Ranger*.

NON-NATO EUROPE

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ALBANIA	35	24	Torpedo: Ch. <i>Huchuan</i> PHT;
		11	Patrol: 2 Sov. <i>Kronshtadt</i> PCO, 6 Ch. <i>Shanghai II</i> , 3 Sov. PU-2 PCI.
AZERBAIJAN (CIS Member; navy operates under Russian control. 16 Units from ex-Soviet Caspian Sea Flotilla)			
	16	13	1 <i>Osa II</i> , 2 <i>Stenka</i> PFI, 1 <i>Zhuk</i> PCI, 3 <i>Sonya</i> PCM, 2 <i>Yvgenya</i> PCM and approximately 4 <i>Polnochny</i> LSM.
BULGARIA	21	7	Corvettes: 4 <i>Poti</i> , 1 <i>Tarantul II</i> , 2 <i>Pauk II</i>
		7	Msl.: 6 <i>Osa</i> PFM
		7	Inshore: <i>Zhuk</i> PFI.
CROATIA*	9	2	Corvettes: 2 <i>Kraji</i>
		3	Msl.: 2 <i>Rade koncar</i> PFM; 1 <i>Mitar Acev</i> (<i>Osa I</i>) PFM
		2	Torpedo: 2 <i>Topcider</i>
		2	Inshore: 2 <i>Mirna</i>
CYPRUS * (Paramilitary: Maritime Police. 3 PFI: 2 <i>Evagoras</i> , 1 <i>Kinon</i> PFI)			
ESTONIA (Paramilitary: Maritime Border Guard: 12 PC/PCI)			
FINLAND*	21	2	Corvettes: 2 <i>Turnmaa</i>
		10	Msl.: 4 <i>Helsinki</i> PFM, 2 <i>Tuima</i> (<i>Osa II</i>), 4 <i>Rauma</i> PFM
		9	Inshore: 2 <i>Rihtniemi</i> , 4 <i>Ruissalo</i> , 5 <i>Nuoli</i> .
GEORGIA (Coast Guard under development with units of former Soviet Black Sea Fleet)			
IRELAND	7	7	PCO: 1 <i>Eithne</i> , 2 <i>Emef</i> , 1 <i>Desrde</i> , 2 <i>Orla</i> (UK <i>Peacock</i>).
LATVIA	14		PCI: 2 <i>Kondor II</i> , 3 <i>Osa I</i> , 5 SW Coast Guard.
LITHUANIA	7		PCI: 1 Ex-SW, 2 <i>Turya</i> (ex-Sov.) PHT, 1 ex-GDR <i>Kondor I</i> plus civ.
MALTA	2		PCC: 2 ex-GDR <i>Kondor II</i> PCC and boats.
POLAND*	32	4	Corvettes: 4 <i>Gornik</i> (Sov. <i>Tarantul II</i>)
		7	Msl.: <i>Osa-I</i> PFM
		21	Patrol: 2 <i>Sassnitz</i> ; Inshore: 8 <i>Obluze</i> , 11 <i>Pilica</i> PCI.
ROMANIA*	32	6	Corvettes: 3 Sov. <i>Poti</i> , 3 <i>Tarantul I</i>
		6	Msl.: 6 <i>Osa I</i> PFM
		34	Torp.: 12 <i>Gtirop</i> PT; 22 Ch. <i>Huchuan</i> PFT
	36		Patrol: 4 <i>Democratia</i> , 8 Ch. <i>Shanghai</i> PFI, 4 Ch. <i>Huchuan</i> , 24 Riverine.
SLOVENIA (Maritime Element: 2 PCI)			
SWEDEN*	41	34	PFM: 4 <i>Gotenborg</i> , 2 <i>Stockholm</i> , 16 <i>Hugin</i> , 12 <i>Norrkoping</i>
		7	Patrol; 7 PCI.
UKRAINE*	4	2	<i>Krivak II</i> PCO
		2	1 <i>Petya II</i> , 1 <i>Grishav</i>
		40	Coastal, inshore and riverine (<i>Grisha II</i> , <i>Zhuk</i> , <i>Paulk I</i> , <i>Stenka</i> , <i>Muravey</i> , <i>Shemel</i> plus 2 lg <i>Pomornik</i> hovercraft.)
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO			
	40	9	Msl.: 5 <i>Rade Koncar</i> PFM, 4 <i>Mitar Acev</i> (<i>Osa I</i>)
		21	<i>Topcider</i> (<i>Shershen</i>)
		27	Patrol Inshore: 6 <i>Mirna</i> ; 21 Riverine (rsv).
RUSSIA*	145	77	Corvette: 44 <i>Tarantul</i> , 33 <i>Nanuchka</i>
		28	Msl.: 15 <i>Osa</i> , 13 <i>Matka</i> PHM
		27	Torp.: 27 <i>Turya</i> PHT
		13	Patrol: Offshore 3 T-58/-43; coastal 10: 7 <i>Pauk</i> PFC, 1 <i>Babochka</i> , 2 <i>Mukha</i>
	212		(Paramilitary force: 25 Offshore, 32 coastal and 155 inshore).

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

BAHRAIN	10	2	Corvette: 2 <i>Al Manama</i> (<i>Ge. Lur.</i> 62m)
		4	Msl.: <i>Ahmad El Fateh</i> (<i>Ge. Lur.</i> 45m)
		4	Patrol: 2 <i>Al Riffa</i> (<i>Ge. Lur.</i> 38m) PFI; 2 PFI
(Plus approximately 30 paramilitary force and support ships).			
EGYPT*	44	26	Msl.: 6 <i>Ramad An</i> , 6 <i>Osa I</i> , 6 <i>6th Oct.</i> , 2 Sov. <i>Komar</i> , 6b Ch. <i>Hegu</i>
		18	Patrol: 8 Ch <i>Hinan</i> PFC, 6 <i>Shershen</i> PFI, 4 <i>Shanghai II</i> PFI.
(Paramilitary force: 34 PCC inshore.)			

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ISRAEL*	55	1	Corvette: 1 <i>Eilat</i>
	19		Msl.: 2 <i>Aliya</i> , 2 <i>Romat</i> , 1 <i>Hetz</i> , 8 <i>Reshef</i> , 6 <i>Mivtach/Sa'ar</i>
	35		Patrol Inshore: 35 <i>Super Dvora/Dvora/Dabur</i> PCI
JORDAN*	5	5	Patrol: 3 <i>Al Hussein (Vosper 30m)</i> PFI, 2 <i>Bremse</i> PCI.
			(Plus 3 <i>Rotork</i> craft and armed boats.)
KUWAIT*	6	2	Msl.: 1 <i>Estiglal (Ge. Lur. FPB 57)</i> PFM, 1 <i>Al Sanbouk (Ge. Lur. TNC)</i>
		4	Patrol: 4 <i>Intisar</i> PFI (and 55 armed boats).
LEBANON*	9		Patrol Inshore: 5 UK Attacker, 4 Tracker PCI and armed boats.
OMAN	12	4	Msl.: <i>Dhofar</i>
		8	Patrol: 4 <i>Al Wafi</i> PCI, 4 <i>Seeb (Vosper 25m)</i> PCI.
			(Additionally there are 2 <i>Al Mabruktah</i> support and training ships used in an offshore role; 16 Police Coast Guard craft also.)
QATAR	9	3	Msl.: 3 <i>Damsah (Fr. LCBT III)</i>
		6	Patrol: 6 Inshore: 6 <i>Barzan (UK-33m)</i> PCI.
			(Plus 44 craft operated by Maritime Police.)
SAUDI ARABIA	29	9	Msl.: 9 <i>Al Siddiq (US 58m)</i> PFM
		3	Torpedo: 3 <i>Dammam (Ge. Jag.)</i>
		17	Patrol: 17 US Halter Marine PCI.
SYRIA*	29	18	Msl.: 14 <i>Osa I/II</i> PFM, 4 <i>Komar</i>
		11	Patrol: 8 <i>Zhuk</i> PFI, 1 <i>Matya (ex-MSO)</i> , 2 <i>Hamelin</i> PFI.
U.A.E.	19	2	Corvette: 2 <i>Muray Jip (Ge. Lur. 62m)</i>
		8	Msl.: 6 <i>Banyas (Ge. Lur. 45m)</i>
		9	Patrol Inshore: 6 <i>Ardhana (UK Vosper)</i> PFI, 3 <i>Kawkab</i> PCI.
ALGERIA	22	3	Corvette: <i>Rais Hamidon (Nanuchka II)</i>
		11	Msl.: <i>Osa</i>
		8	Patrol: Coastal 2 <i>Djebel Chinoise</i> ; 6 Inshore: <i>El Yadekh</i> PCI.
			(Coast Guard under Naval control 7 Ch. <i>Chui</i> PCC; 6 <i>El Yadekh</i> PCI, 16 PCI).
MAURITANIA	6	6	1 <i>N'Madi (UK Jura)</i> PCO, 3 <i>El Vaiz (Sp. Barcelo)</i> PFI, 1 <i>El Nasr (Fr. Patra)</i> PCI, 1 <i>Z'Bar (Ge. Neustadt)</i> PI and 3 armed boats.
MOROCCO*	27	2	Corvette: 2 <i>It Assad (ex-Iraqi navy)</i>
		4	Msl.: <i>Cdt. El Khattabi (Sp. Lazaga 58m)</i>
		23	Patrol: 13 Coastal 2 <i>Okba (Fr. PR-72)</i> PFC, 6 <i>Ly Rablii</i> PCC, 5 <i>El Hahiq (Dk. Osprey 55)</i> PCC. Inshore: 10 <i>El Waeil (Fr. P-32)</i> PFI.
TUNISIA*	20	6	Msl.: 3 <i>La Galite (Fr LCBIII)</i> PFM, 3 <i>Bizerte</i>
		14	Patrol: 2 <i>Gatsal (Shanghai)</i> PFI, 2 <i>Tazarka (Vosper 31m)</i> PCI, 10 PCI.
CENTRAL & SOUTH ASIA			
BANGLADESH*	40	8	Msl.: 4 <i>Durdarsha (Huangfeng)</i> , 4 <i>Durbar (Hegu)</i> PFM
		8	Torpedo: <i>Huchan</i> PFT
		24	Patrol: Offshore: 1 <i>Shaeed (ex-Jersey)</i> , 2 <i>Durjoy (Hainan)</i> , 2 <i>Meybna</i> , 1 <i>Shahjalal (PCO)</i> ; Inshore: 8 <i>Shabead Daulat (Shanghai)</i> , 2 <i>Karmaphuli</i> , 2 <i>Padma</i> , 1 <i>Bishaliali (PCI)</i> ; Riverine: 5.
INDIA*	40	15	Corvette: 3 <i>Vijay Durg (Nanuchka II)</i> , 5 <i>Veer (Tarantul)</i> 3 <i>Vibhuti (Tarantul variant)</i> , 4 <i>Abhar (Pauk II)</i>
		6	Msl.: <i>Vidyut (Osa II)</i>
		19	Patrol: Offshore: <i>Sukanya</i> PCO; Inshore 12 SDB Mk 2/3; plus 43 Coast Guard craft: 9 <i>Vikram</i> PCO, 11 <i>Tara Bai</i> PCC, 5 <i>Rayhams</i> , PFI 7 <i>Jija Bai</i> PCI.
KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN: None at present; Caspian Sea Flotilla is operating as a joint Russian/Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan flotilla under Russian control.			
MYNMAR (BURMA)			
	56	2	Corvette: 1 <i>Yan Taing Aung (US PC3-827)</i> , 1 <i>Yan Gyi Aung (US Admirable MSF)</i>
		10	Coastal: <i>Yan Sit Aung (Hainan)</i>

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PAKISTAN*	13	15	Inshore: 12 US PGM, 3 Yug PB90 PF and 29 Riverine <i>Nauarat</i> plus Yug.
		8	Msl: 4 Ch. <i>Huangfeng</i> , 4 Ch. <i>Hegu</i>
		5	Patrol: Coastal: 1 <i>Baluchistan</i> (Hainan) PFC; 4 Inshore: 3 <i>Ouetta</i> (Shanghai) PFI, 1 <i>Rajishali</i> PCI.
SRI LANKA*	43	2	Patrol: 2 <i>Jajesagara</i> PCC; 41 Inshore: 5 <i>Soor-aya</i> , 3 <i>Rana</i> (Shanghai) PFI, 11 <i>Idvora</i> PFI, 3 PFI, 19 PCI and 30 armed boats.
EAST ASIA & AUSTRALIA			
AUSTRALIA *	16	16	Patrol: Inshore 15 <i>Fremantle</i> PFI, 1 <i>Banks</i> PCC.
BRUNEI	6	3	Msl.: <i>Waspada</i> PFM; 3 PFI <i>Perwira</i> .
CAMBODIA	10	10	2 Sov <i>Turya</i> , 2 Sov <i>Stenka</i> , 4 Sov <i>Shmel</i> .
CHINA*	870	217	Msl.: 1 <i>Huang</i> , 6 <i>Houxin</i> , 120 <i>Huangfeng/Hola</i> (Osa I), 90 <i>Hegu</i> (Komar)
		160	Torpedo: 120 <i>Huchnan</i>
		495	Patrol: 100 Coastal: 4 <i>Hai Jui</i> , 96 <i>Hainan</i> ; Inshore: 350: 300 <i>Shanghai</i> , 5 <i>Huludao</i> PFI, 45 <i>Shantou</i> and 45 Riverine. (These figures also include an unspecified number transferred to the Peoples Armed Police.)
FIJI*	7	7	Patrol: 1 <i>Kully</i> , 4 <i>Vai</i> (Is <i>Dabur</i>), 2 <i>Le Vuka</i> PCI's.
INDONESIA*	42	4	Msl: 4 <i>Mandau</i> PFM
		2	Torpedo: 2 <i>Singh</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 57m)
		36	Patrol: 9 Coastal: 3 <i>Barakuda</i> (Kronshtadt), 2 <i>Pandrog</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i>) PCC, 4 <i>Kakap</i> PFC; Inshore: 27 8 <i>Sibarau</i> , 1 <i>Bima Samudera</i> PHM, 18 others.
JAPAN*	6	3	Msl.: <i>Ichi-go</i> PHM
		3	Patrol: <i>Jukyu-go</i> PCI.
MAYLASIA*	37	8	Msl.: 4 <i>Handalan</i> (Sw <i>Spica</i>), 4 <i>Perdana</i> (Fr. <i>LCBT III</i>)
		20	Patrol: 2 Offshore <i>Musytari</i> ; 27 Inshore: 6 <i>Jerong</i> PFI, 3 <i>Kedar</i> , 4 <i>Sabar</i> , 14 <i>Kris</i> PCI. (48 Inshore Patrol Craft assigned to Marine Patrol.)
NEW ZELAND*	4	4	Patrol: <i>Moa</i> PCI (reserve training).
PAUPA NEW GUINEA	4	4	Patrol: <i>Tarangau</i> (Aust <i>Pac Forum</i> 32m) PCI.
PHILIPPINES	44	9	Patrol: Offshore: 1 <i>Rizal</i> (US <i>Auk</i>), 7 <i>Miguel Malvar</i> (US PCC 827), 1 <i>Magat Salamat</i> (US MSF)
		35	Inshore: 2 <i>Aguinaldo</i> , 3 <i>Kagitingan</i> , 12 <i>Seahawk</i> PCI and 18 others.
S. KOREA* (ROK)	122	4	Corvette: <i>Dong Hae</i>
		11	Msl.: 8 <i>Pae Ku-52</i> , 1 <i>Pae Ku-51</i> (US <i>Asheville</i>), 2 <i>Kilurli</i> 71 (<i>Wildcat</i>)
SINGAPORE	26	107	Patrol Inshore: 92 <i>Kiluri II</i> , 15 <i>Chebi-51</i> (<i>Seahawk</i>) PFI.
		6	Corvette: <i>Victory</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 62m)
		6	Msl.: <i>Seawolf</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 45m) PFM
TAIWAN	97	14	Patrol: Inshore 6 <i>Independence/Sovereignty</i> , 8 <i>Swift</i> .
		52	Msl.: 2 <i>Lung Chang</i> PFM, 50 <i>Hai Ou</i>
THAILAND*	62	45	Patrol: Inshore. MARPOL: 72 <i>Vosper</i> and 16 other PCI.
		5	Corvette: 2 <i>Rattanakosin</i> , 3 <i>Khamronsin</i>
		6	Msl.: 3 <i>Ratcharit</i> (It. <i>Breda</i> 50m), 3 <i>Prabparapau</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 45m)
		51	Patrol: 11 Coastal 3 <i>Chon Burf</i> PCC, 6 <i>Sattahip</i> , 2 <i>Sarasin</i> (US PC 461) PCC.
VIETNAM	55		Inshore: 40: 7 US PGM 71 and 33 PCI.
		8	Msl.: <i>Osa I</i>
		19	Torpedo: 3 <i>Turya</i> PHT, 16 <i>Shersten</i> PFT
		28	Patrol: Inshore: 8 Sov. SO-1, 3 PGM, 11 <i>Zhuk</i> , 2 <i>Turya</i> .
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA			
BAHAMAS	12	12	Patrol: 3 <i>Yellow Elder</i> , 1 <i>Marlin</i> , 3 <i>Fenrick Sturup</i> and 5 PCI.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	17	9	Patrol: Offshore: 1 <i>Mella</i> (Can. <i>River</i>), 3 <i>Cambiasos</i> (US <i>Cahoos</i>), 3 armed tugs, 2 <i>Prestol</i> (US <i>Admirable</i>)
		8	Inshore: 1 <i>Betelgeuse</i> (US PGM 71), 1 <i>Capitan Al.</i> , 6 PCI.

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HAITI (boats only)
JAMAICA 4
TRINIDAD/TABAGO

(CG) Patrol Inshore: 1 *Ft. Chas.* PFI, 3 PF.

BELIZE 1
COSTA RICA 7

Patrol Inshore: 2 *Barracuda* PFI (Sw *Karls.*), 7 PCI.

Patrol: 1 PCI, 8 armed boats and 3 ramped lighters.

Patrol Inshore: 1 *Isla del Coco* (Swift 32m) PFI, 1 *Astronanta Chag.* (C. Higgins) PCI, 5 PCI and 10 boats.

GUATEMALA 9
MEXICO 104

Patrol: 1 *Krukilkan* (US *Broadsword* 32m) PFI, 8 PCI and other boats.

40 Patrol: Offshore: 4 *S.J. Holzanger*, 6 *Uribe*, 1 *Azueta*, 3 *Zacatlacas*, 17 *Valle*, 1 *Grande Junction*, 12 D-01 (US *Admirable* MSF).

40 Inshore: 40 PCI's and 20 Riverine craft.

NICARAGUA 10
PANAMA 7

Patrol Inshore: 2 *Zhuk* 2 NK *Sing Hung*, 6 PCI.

Patrol Inshore: 2 *Pamquiao* (*Vosper*), 1 *3 de Nov.*, 3 US ex-MSB, 4 other.

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA* 14

2 Torpedo: 2 *Intrepida* (Ge. *Lur.* 45) PFT

12 Patrol: 8 Offshore: 1 *T. Olivieri*, 3 *Ingoya*, 2 *King*, 2 *Sobral* (US AT).

BOLIVIA

10 River Patrol craft and 15 US *Boston Whalers*.

BRAZIL* 29

Patrol Offshore: 9 *Imperial Mar.* PCO; 1 *Grejan* PCC 6 *Piratire*

Inshore: 3 *Aspirante*, 4 *Tracker* PCI and 6 river patrol.

CHILE* 19

4 Msl.: 2 *Casara* (Is. *Reshef*) PFM, 2 *Iquique* (Is. *Sa'ar*) PFM

4 Torpedo: 4 *Guarolda* (Ge. *Lur.* 36m)

11 Patrol: 11 PCO (ex-US tugs), 3 *Micalvi* PCC, 1 *Papudo* (ex-US PC) PCC, 6 *G. Diaz* (Is. *Dabur*) PCI.

COLOMBIA* 39

39 Patrol: Offshore: 3 *P. Heredia* (ex-US tugs); Inshore: 11 *Q. Sueno* (US *Asheville*) PFI, 2 *Rado* (Swiftships), 3 *J. Palas* PCI and 25 Riverine.

ECUADOR* 12

6 Corvettes: 6 *Esmeraldas*

6 Msl.: 3 *Quito* (Ge. *Lur.* 45m), 3 *Manta* (Ge. *Lur.* 36m) PFM.

EL SALVADOR* 5

Patrol Inshore: 3 *Camcraft* 30m, 2 PCI.

GUYANA*

2 Boats.

HONDURAS* 11

Patrol Inshore: 3 *Guaymuas*, 2 *Copan* PFI, 6 PCI and several boats.

PARAGUAY 7

Patrol: 5 Coastal (2 *Paraguay*, 3 ex-Arg. MSO), 2 River.

PERU 7

Msl.: 6 *Velarde* PFM (Fr. PR-72)

Patrol: *Unanue* (ex-US *Sotoyomo*) PCC; 15 Riverine.

SURINAME 5

Patrol Craft Inshore

URUGUAY* 10

Patrol: Inshore: 2 *Colonia* (US *Cape Higgins*) PCI, 3 *15 Nov.* PFI (Fr. *Vigilante*) and others.

VENEZUELA* 6

6 Msl.: *Constitucion* (UK *Vosper*).

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

DJIBOUTI 3

Patrol Inshore: 3 PCI plus numerous boats.

ERITREA 13

2 Msl.: 2 *Osa I*

Torpedo: 2 *Turya* PHT, 2 *Mol* PFT

Patrol Inshore: 7 PFI, 3 US *Swiftships*, 4 *Zhuk*.

SUDAN 6

Patrol: 2 *Kadir* PCI, 4 *River* PCI, 10 armed boats.

KENYA* 7

6 Msl.: 6 *Nyayo* (*Vosper*), 2 *Mamba*, 3 *Ma Daraka* (UK *Brooke*) PFM

Patrol Inshore: 1 *Simba* (*Vosper* 31m) PCI.

MADAGASCAR 1

PATROL: 1 *Malaika* (Fr. PR 48m) PCI.

MARITUS

Paramilitary only; 4 PCI.

SEYSELLES

Paramilitary only; 4 PFI.

TANZANIA 22

4 Torpedo: 4 *Ch. Huchuan* PHT

Patrol Inshore: 18: 8 *Shanghai II* PFI plus 10 PCI and several boats.

CAMEROON 2

1 Msl.: 1 *Bakassi* (Fr. P48) PFI and 1 Riverine *L'Audacieux* PFI.

CAPE VERDE

1 PCI assigned to Coast Guard.

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MADAGASCAR	1		PATROL: 1 <i>Malaika</i> (Fr. PR 48m) PCI.
MARITUS			Paramilitary only; 4 PCI.
SEYSELLES			Paramilitary only; 4 PFI.
TANZANIA	22	4	Torpedo: 4 Ch. <i>Huchuan</i> PHT
			Patrol Inshore: 18: 8 <i>Shanghai II</i> PFI plus 10 PCI and several boats.
CAMEROON	2	1	Msl.: 1 <i>Bakassi</i> (Fr. P48) PFI and 1 Riverine <i>L'Audacieux</i> PFI.
CAPE VERDE			1 PCI assigned to Coast Guard.
CONGO*	6	6	Patrol Inshore: 6: 3 <i>Marien N'Goubabi</i> (Sp. <i>Barcelo</i>), 3 <i>Zhuk</i> PFI.
EQ. GUINEA	4		Patrol: 3 PFI and 1 PCI.
GABON	3	1	Msl.: 1 Gen. Naz. <i>Boulingu</i> (Fr. 42m) PFM
			Patrol: 2 Gen. <i>Ba'Ounar</i> (Fr. P 400).
ZAIRE	4		Patrol Inshore: 2 <i>Shanghai II</i> PFI and 2 <i>Swiftships</i> along with 10 armed boats.
BENIN	1		Patrol Inshore: 1 <i>Patriote</i> PFI; 4 <i>Zhur</i> (in storage).
COTE D'IVOIRE	4	2	Msl.: 2 <i>L'Argent</i> (Fr. <i>Auroux</i>)
			Patrol: 2 <i>Le Vigilant</i> (Fr SFLN) PCI.
GHANA*	4		Patrol: 2 <i>Achinota</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 57m) PCI; Inshore: 2 <i>Dzata</i> (Ge. <i>Lur</i> 45).
GUINEA*	8		Patrol: 3 <i>Bogomo</i> PFI, 2 <i>Zhuk</i> , 1 <i>Swiftship</i> , 2 PCI.
G-BISSAU*	7		Patrol Inshore: 1 <i>Kondor</i> , 2 <i>Bogomol</i> , 2 <i>Shantow</i> , 2 PCI.
MALI*	3		River craft.
NIGERIA	53	2	Corvette: <i>Erinomi</i> (<i>Vosper</i>)
		6	Msl.: 3 <i>Ekpe</i> (Ge. <i>Lur.</i> 57) PFM. 3 <i>Siei</i> (Fr. <i>Comb</i>) PFM
		45	Patrol Inshore: 4 <i>Makurdi</i> (<i>Brooke</i>) and 45 PCI.
SENEGAL*	10	2	Patrol: 1 <i>Fouta</i> (<i>Osprey</i>) PCC, 1 <i>Njamburr</i> (Fr. SFLN) PCC
		8	Inshore: 3 <i>St. Louis</i> , 3 <i>Senegal II</i> , 2 UK <i>Tracker</i> PCI.
SIERRA LEONE	3		Patrol: 2 <i>Shanghai II</i> , 1 <i>Swiftship</i> PCI.
TOGO*	2		Patrol Inshore: 2 <i>Dkara</i> (Fr. <i>Esterel</i>) PFI.
ANGOLA	17	6	Msl.: <i>Osa II</i>
		4	Torpedo: <i>Shershen</i> HWT
		7	Patrol Inshore: 2 <i>Poluchat</i> , 1 <i>Zhuk</i> , 4 <i>Buzon</i> PCI
MOZAMBIQUE	10		Patrol Inshore: 3 <i>Zhuk</i> , 7 PCI.
SOUTH AFRICA	12	9	Msl.: <i>Jan Smuts</i> (Is. <i>Reshef</i>)
		3	Patrol Inshore: PFI

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